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Some Theoretical Aspects of Base Control
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the implications of using the monetary base
or bank reserves as an instrument to control a monetary aggregate. Fol-
lowing analysis of a series of theoretical models of increasing complexity,
it is concluded that in a system with either institutional or structural
lags base control may entail very sharp and possibly undamped oscillations
of short—term interest rates. The shorter the time period over which the
authorities choose to bring the monetary aggregate back to its target,
the more volatile will be the movements of interest rates. Furthermore,
there is an asymmetry in the U.S. institutional structure such that rigid
implementation of the base control system will under certain circumstances
lead to a decline in short—term interest rates to very low levels. The
final section of the paper is devoted to the examination of the Canadian
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1.Introduction
One can divide into two groups the decisionssurrounding
the implementation of a monetary policy basedon the use of monetary
aggregates as intermediate targets ——onegroup is composed of strategic
decisions, the other of tactical decisions. The former include such
questions as which monetary aggregate provides the most appropriate
target (narrow versus broad aggregates) and how rapidly should the rate
of growth of that target be brought down (gradualismversus cold—shower
policies). In addition there is the even more basic questionas to how
one interprets a strategy of targeting on a monetaryaggregate. Of the
three principal contending approaches one can be derived from thework
of Poole (1970), one is related to the reduced—formtypes of equations,
and the third can be thought of as feedback mechanism in whichinterest
rates respond in the appropriate direction to nominal income growth that
is too rapid or too slow.1
The tactical questions presuppose that a choice has been
made regarding the target rate of growth of a specificmonetary aggregate
over some horizon period. In this category of questions one canplace
the choice of fan versus band and the width of the fanor band (i.e.,
the difference between upper and lower targets), whether theauthorities—2—
areprepared to allow the monetary aggregate to remain outside the limits
for a period of time or will respond to movements of themonetary
aggregate within the band, and the horizon over which they attempt
to bring the monetary aggregate back within the band should it move
outside the limits. Perhaps the most important of these taccical
questionsis whether the authorities should tryto achieve their
monetarytarget by operating on interest rates, i.e., by sliding up
and down the demand curve for money, or byoperating on the base or bank
reserves.2 A recentinterchange on this question of therelative merits
ofthe use of base control versus interest ratecontrol as the mechanism for
influencingthe movements of the monetary aggregates can be found in
White (1979) and Courchene (1979)
In Canada the authorities have used interestrates as
theproximate instrent intheachievement of theintermediate—runnarrow
moneytarget. Until October 1979 this was also the mechanism
used in the United States where the authorities placed mostemphasis
on the federal funds rate in their operating procedures. However,on
October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve announced a change in these
procedures that moved the focus away from the federal funds rateand
towardsreserve measures as a means of controlling the monetary
aggregates.3 The subject of shortrun procedures is also a current
issue in the United Kingdom where debate is now going on over
the optimal methods of implementing a monetary aggregate policy.4
Switzerland, which appears to have opted for a system of base as both—3-.
a target and instrument, is used as an example by those who wish
the authorities to drop monetary aggregates altogether and focus
only on base.5 In Germany, central bank money (which is very similar
to base) has been used as a target but a combination of interest rates
and other control techniques have been used to achieve this target.
Thus there is a variety of international experience on which one could
draw in assessing the relative merits of different techniques although
one would have to take into account the different institutional
environments in different countries.
In this paper I carry Outa theoreticalanalysis of the
implications of using base or bank reserves to control a monetary
aggregate. That is, I examine the role of base as an instrument
but not as a target. Most studies of such a form of control
have focussed on the stability and predictability of the money multiplier.
This approach has serious drawbacks for those who do not believe in
the usefulness of the money multiplier notion, particularly in a world
with both institutional and economic lags. It is also the case that
the adherents of base control and the money multiplier approach 'nave
tended to emphasize the "supply of money"7 and have tended to downplay
or ignore the demand for money. But it is the interaction of demand
and"supply" functionsthat determines both the resulting level ofmoney
and the level of interest rates. And at least in somecases it is
possible that rigid adherence to some formsof basecontrol will lead
to explosive (i.e., undamped) oscillations in interest rates andperhaps
even in the monetary aggregate itself. Hence it is worth analyzing the—4—
movements of interest rates in cases where the authorities are using base
control to see whether this instability problem can arise. Furthermore,
by investigating in depth the implications of base control in a variety
of models one can gain insights into the strengths and weaknesses of
base control and the institutional settings in which it is more or
less likely to lead to desirable outcomes. Furthermore, the limitations
of base control in achieving the monetary targets over a short—run
horizon will also become clear.
The paper is structured as follows. A series of models
of increasing complexity are introduced and the implications of base
control are examined in each case. I begin with a simple model without
institutional or economic lags and without uncertainty, with non—interest
bearing demand deposits as the only liability of the banking system, and without
currency. In this model banks adjust their portfolio by buying and
selling liquid assets since no liability side management is possible.
I then introduce the following modifications to the basic model but
for the sake of simplicity each modification is added to the simple
basic model and therefore in general I do not allow for the complexities
that might arise in making cwo or more modifications at the same time.
In the first change to the model I introduce currency holding by the
public as a part of money demand. In the next model I assume that the
banks issue time deposits but still use changes in liquid assets as the
mechanism for adjusting their portfolios. The following version of—5—
the model, probably the most important one in terms of substantive
conclusions, allows for the existence of lags in the system, both
economic as in the demand for money, and institutional, as in lagged
reserve accounting. The role of excess reserves and borrowed reserves
is explored in detail in the context of this model. Using these
theoretical models as a basis I carry out an analysis of the U.S. system
of base control and an assessment of what can be learned from its
operation thus far. This is followed by the construction of a theoretical
model of the Canadian institutional structure that emphasizes the differences
between the U.S. and the Canadian system. Finally, I offer some conclusions
that can be drawn from the analysis.
There are a number of limitations to the analysis to
which attention should be drawn. First, it accepts as given the two—
stage procedure in which base is used to target on an intermediate
monetary aggregate and the latter in turn is related to the final
target variable. However, Friedman (1975) has argued that in general
there is no need for an intermediate monetary target and that the
monetary instrument (base or interest rate) should be directed towards
achieving the final target. Second, it is assumed that the authorities
are trying to hit actual money and hence are not adjusting their targets
to take into account the stochastic nature of money demand. This is
in line with the prescription of most advocates of base control although
it maybenon—optimal in cases where there are stochastic movements—6—
in the demand for money equation. Third, I offer no empirical work
in this paper. The significance of some of the theoretical results
discussed below will depend on whether the relevant conditions are fulfilled
in practice or not, Fourth, the analysis is limited to the financial
sub—sector. I am thus implicitly assuming that over the period of time
analyzed in the paper (i.e., the short run) there is little or no
effect on the real sector or price sector of movements in financial
9
variables.This limitation of the analysis can be removed by
adding the other sectors to the model but, at least in the more complex
analysis with lags, the resulting model may not be analytically
tractable and hence one may have to have recourse to computer simulations.
Fifth, I use only one interest rate in the model, thereby obviating
the need to deal with the relationships between the one—day rate
that is determined principally by the banking system in their attenpt
to adjust their reserve position, the 30— to 90—day rates that are
more important in the demand for money equation, and the long—term rates
that enter into investment functions. The oscillations of the one—day
rate that are the focus of this paper would not be very important if
they did not result in similar movements in the longer—term money market
and bond market rates. However, recent theoretical work by Shiller (1979)
and Pesando (1980) on the volatility of longer—term rates and the U.S.
experience of the past year suggest that there can be a great deal of
volatility even in the longer—term rates engendered by sharp movements
in the very short—term rates. The effect of the movements of one—day—7--
rates on longer—term rates makes the argument of this paper more general
than might otherwise be thought. Sixth, the models are all deterministic
in nature. Introducing additive uncertainty to the initial model gives
results similar to those found by Pierce and Thomson (1972).
2. The Models
2.1 Model 1: No lags, one bank liability, no currency
There is the very simplest textbook case. Money is
defined as non—interest bearing demand deposits held with the banks and
the banks are assumed to have no liabilities other than demand deposits.
Reserve requirements are contemporaneous and all relationships are
deterministic with no stochastic component. There are also assumed to





In equation (1), required reserves (aR) are a constant fraction of
contemporaneous demand deposits (DD). Equation (2) sets out the
equality of required reserves and total reserves (RT), i.e., there
are no excess reserves held by the banks. One can think of required
reserves as the demand for reserves and total reserves as the supply—8—
of reserves. 'Tote also that there are no borrowed reserves in this
system and therefore that the central bank is directly controlling
total reserves. In equation (3) the public's demand for demand deposits
is expressed as a function of the one interest rate in the system (i)
and of real income (Y).10 Finally, the monetary aggregate on which
the authorities are targeting (MA) is equal to demand deposits in
this system. Throughout the paper, all coefficients are positive.
Solving (1), (2), and (4) one gets
(5) MA(t) =(RT(t)).
This is a standard money multiplier result in which the target money
aggregate is tightly linked to the reserve variable under the control
of the central bank. An even more basic formulation would have an
equation linking the supply of reserves to the asset side of the central
bank's balance sheet and would thus relate changes in the money supply
toopen market purchases and sales.
There is a second equation implicit in the system developed
above, that linking the interest rate to total reserves.
(6) i(t) =(a+cY(t)-RT(t)).
An increase in total reserves leads to an imediate decline in the
interest rate, the magnitude of the decline being a function cf both
the reserve requirement d, andthe interest rate coefficient in the
demandfor money, b. The smaller is either of these parameters,
the larger the effect on the interest rate of a given change in reserves.—9—
Even in the context of this very simple model attention
should be drawn to several important points. First, although reserves
can be used to hit the target monetary aggregate, interest rates can
be used equally well as shown by replacing DID by MA in the demand for
money equation and then treating i as the instrument. Second, although
the focus of the base or reserve control approach is on the supply
of reserves, it is the case that the demand for money equation must
always be satisfied. The way the demand for money equation is satisfied
in the short run is via the interest rate movements shown in equation (6). It
must not be assumed that the authorities somehow force an increased amount
of money into a non—bank public that is unwilling to hold it or force an
unwilling public to give up money that it would like to retain. Allexchanges
are voluntary in our system and there is no "money rationing". The
public is induced to increase or decrease its holdings of money by
interest rate changes and, indeed, it is these interest rate changes
that are the fulcrum of the effect of changes in the monetary aggregate
on output, employment, the exchange rate and prices inmost macro—economic
models.
A third element in this analysis is the implicit structure
of the banking system assumed in this model. This structure may play
an important role in determining whether or not a change in reserves
leads cowards or away from the new equilibrium, i.e., whether or not the
model is stable. In manybaseor reserve control models there is
implicitly or explicitly a banking system balance sheet in which the— 10—
bankshold liquid assets and reserves as their assets and demand deposits
as their liabilities. Furthermore in response to an increase (decrease)
in reserves created by the central bank through open market operations
the banks buy (sell) liquid assets thereby pushing down (up) interest
rates and increasing (reducing) demand deposits. This dynamic story
of the reactions of the chartered banks to a reserve change is the usual
one discussed in the textbooks as part of the explanation of the money
multiplier. What is sometimes omitted in the textbooks is the fact
that it is the interest rate changes that induce the non—bank public
to exchange liquid assets for deposits and vice versa. Furthermore,
models in which the banks rely on liability management to adjust their
balance sheets can give different results. This subject will be
addressed in a future paper.
One final element worth noting in this model is the absence
of a money supply equation. In this model and all the succeeding models,
the crucial equation is that in which the supply of reserves created by
the central bank is equated to the demand for reserves which is a function
of the magnitude of reservable deposits, the reserve requirement, and
in some cases of the desired holding of excess reserves. These supply
and demand functions are the basic building blocks of the analysis and
they can be related to the behaviour of the central bank and the
banking system, respectively. An alternative approach to analyzing
the model is to solve out for the monetary aggregate as a function of
reserves as in equation (5).Instead of treating this result as one— 11—
ofthe reduced—form equations of the model (along with equation (6))
it is often treated as a money supply equation. Since the money supply
combines the behaviour of the banks and the central bank (and indeed
in some models the behaviour of the non—bank public and the government
as well) it is not a supply equation in the usual sense of the word.
This causes no problems as long as one realizes that the money supply
defined in this way is an artificial construct and does not simply
represent the behaviour of any single group in the model or the economy.
Nonetheless it seems to me to be much simpler to discuss the financial
side of the economy in terms of the basic transactors whose behaviour
is being modelled and I shall continue to do so throughout the analysis)2
2.2 Model 2: No lags, one bank liability plus currency
Thus far it has been assumed that the target monetary
aggregate consisted only of demand deposits and that the liabilities of
the central bank consisted only of the reserves of the chartered banks.
In fact, currency is part of the narrow monetary aggregate and it is
13 also a liability of the central bank.
(7) RR(t)=dDD(t)
(8)B(t) =RR(t)+ C(t)
(9)DD(t) + C(t) =a—bi(t) + cY(t)
(10) MA(t) =DD(t)+ C(t).— 12—
Inequation (8) the supply of base (B) is equated to the demand for
base, which is the sum of required reserves and currency (C). The
target monetary aggregate is the sum of demand deposits and currency
and the demand curve for these money balances is assumed to be the usual
function of income and the interest rate.
Carrying out the usual algebraic manipulations one gets
the following two equations
(11) MA(t) =B(t)— —1)C(t)
(12) i(t) (a + cY(t) -B(t)+ (-1)C(t)).
To achieve the monetary aggregate target the central bank must be
able to respond to shifts between currency and demand deposits. For
example, if d were equal to 0.1, a one dollar random shift from demand
deposits to currency, with base unchanged, would lead to a $9 decline
in total money, and a corresponding increase in the interest rate. The
appropriate response of the authorities to a one dollar shift from
demand deposits to currency would be to increase base by $0.90. In
such a case, currency rises by $1, reserves fall by $0.10, demand
deposits fall by $1, and therefore the target monetary aggregate is
unchanged)4 In terms of the multiplieranalysis, large random shifts between
currency and demand deposits imply a very volatile multiplier. In
contrast, if the interest rate is used as the instrument via the demand
for money equation, then shifts betweencurrency and demand deposits
cause no operational difficulties.— 13
A common way of treating currency in this type of model
is to assume a stable relationship between currency and demand deposits
held by the non—bank public.
(13) C(t)/DD(t) =e.
Then the money supply equation becomes
(14) =B(t).
Thusthesimplicity of the base control relationship is re—established
if the ratio of currency to demand deposits is constant, i.e., if there
are no random shifts between the two components of money.
2.3 Model 3: No lags, two bank liabilities, no currency
In this model I assume that banks issue interest—bearing
time deposits but that they do not use these time deposits to conduct
liability management. One simple way of introducing these "passive"
time deposits into the analysis is to postulate that the banks move the
time deposit rate in line with movements of market rates of interest
and accept the resulting volume of time deposits.
(15) RR(t)=dDD(t)+ tTD(t) 0 td
(16) RT(t) =RR(t)
(17)DD(t) =a—bi(t) +cY(t)— 14—
(18a)MA(t) =DD(t)
(18b)MA(t) =DD(t)+ TD(t)
(19) TD(t)=f+ g i(t) + hY(t).
Required reservesare now a function of both demand deposits and time
deposits (TD) with the reserve ratio on time deposits smaller than or
equal to that on demand deposits. The target monetary aggregate
can be specified either in terms of narrow money i.e., demand deposits
in this model where currency does not exist (equation (18a)), or broad
money i.e., demand deposits plus time deposits (equation (18b)). The
level of time deposits demanded is directly related to the market rate
of interest since a rise in the latter brings about a corresponding
rise in the time deposit rate and, hence, a shift from demand deposits
to both market instruments and time deposits. Note that this argument
implies that b >gsince some of the reduction of demand deposits in
response to a rise in interest rates corresponds to a movement into
market instruments.15 The demand for time deposits is also directly
• 16 related to the level of nominal income.
The reduced—form equations in this model are more
complicated than those in the earlier models because of the movements
between time deposits and demand deposits as interest rates increase.
The equation corresponding to the use of narrow monetary aggregate
as target is labelled (a) and that corresponding to the broad aggregate
is labelled (b).15 —
(20)i(t)
bd—tg
(a +f + (c + Y (t) —RT(t))
(21a) MA(t) RT(t) —TD(t)
=(1+ bd—tgRT(t)
bd—tg
(bf + ag) —
bd—tg





(bh + cg) Y(t)
Since b >g,as discussed above, and dt by our assumptions regarding
the institutional framework, bd >tg.Hence the denominators of all
the fractions are positive.
If the authorities' preferred aggregate is the narrow
monetary aggregate, an increase in income with reserves constant will
result in a decline in the monetary aggregate. This result occurs
because the increase in income leads to an increase in the demand for
time deposits both directly and through the induced increase in interest
rates. The increase in time deposits means that less demand deposits
can be supported by the given reserves, to use the money multiplier
terminology. On the other hand, if the broader aggregate is the
focus of policy an increase in income with reserves constant leads to
an increase in the monetary aggregate since the rise in time deposits
more than offsets the decline in demand deposits when the latter bear
a higher reserve requirement than the former.
It is clear that if the authorities wish to simplify
their task of linking reserves with the preferred monetaryaggregate,— 16—
theyshould set t equal to zero if they pursue a narrow aggregate
policy and t equal to d if they pursue a broad aggregate policy. In
both cases this would have the effect of simplifying the reduced—form
equation for money equation to its most basic form, i.e., MA(t)=RT(t).
Thus the intuitively obvious conclusion is reached, at least for this
simple model ——imposea uniform reserve requirement on all the components
of the monetary aggregate but do not impose a reserve requirement on
deposits that are not included in the aggregate.17 With a split reserve
requirement or with reserves on deposits not included in the aggregate
the authorities must act to offset shifts among components by adjusting
18 . thevolume of reserves. In the language of multiplier analysis, the
authorities must adjust reserves to offset any change in the multiplier
brought about by shifts between time deposits and demand deposits.
As pointed out above, with a split reserve requirement
an increase in income leads to a fall in the narrow aggregate and an
increase in the broader aggregate, if reserves are held constant. To
keep the monetary aggregate constant in the face of an increase in
income reserves would have to be increased in the case in which the
authorities are targeting on the narrow aggregate and reduced in the
case in which the authorities are targeting on the broader aggregate.
Using (19) one can see that this implies that with a rise in income
interest rates would increase more in the case of a broad aggregate target
than in the case of a narrow aggregate target.19 This point has been
an important element of the discussion about the choice of a narrow
aggregate by the Bank of Canada. See White (1979).- 17
2.4 Model 4: Lags, one bank liability, no currency
The discussion thus far has been limited to fairly simple
textbook types of models and has analyzed the implications of base
or reserve control in these settings. I now turn to more realistic
models of the economic environment in which lags in behaviour play a
crucial role. I begin with a version of the demand for money equation
in which the response of money demand to interest rate changes takes
place via a distributed lag. I then introduce the existence of borrowed
reserves and excess reserves into the model. This modification enables
us to deal with the possibility of control of non—borrowed reserves
rather than total reserves by the central bank. The institutional lag
in reserve requirements is then brought into the discussion. In the
light of these models, I will discuss the new U.S. approach to reserve
control in the next section of the paper.
Model 4a: Economic lags, no borrowed or excess reserves
In this model the demand for money equation includes
lagged interest rates as an explanatory variable in addition to current
interest rates. This is in line with estimated equations of money
demand in virtually all of which interest rates take some time to affect
the quantity of money demanded.
(22) RR(t)dDD(t)





There would be no difficulty in generalizing themoney demand equation
to incorporate a lagged income term or an error term.20 Since there
are no borrowed or excess reserves in this version of the model, the
reserves equation retains its simple form of an equality between the
supply of total reserves and the demand for required reserves. The
reduced—form equations for the monetary aggregate and the interest rate
are as follows:
(26) MA(t)=RT(t)
b1 (27) i(t) =(a+cY(t)-RT(t))-i(t-1).
0 0
The monetary aggregate retains its usual simple form in this model. The
interest rate equation, however, now contains a lagged dependent variable
with a coefficient that is the ratio of the effect on the demand for
money of the lagged interest rate to the effect of the current interest
rate. Regardless of the relative magnitudes of these coefficients this
formulation implies a sawtooth movement of interest rates inresponse
to a change in income with reserves constant or to a change in reserves
with income constant. Furthermore, if, as is not unlikely in practice,
b1 is greater than b0, i.e., the lagged effects of inceresz rate changes— 19—
dominatethe current effects,2' then the coefficient on the lagged
interest rate in equation (27) will be greater than one in absolute
value and the movement of interest rates will follow a path of explosive
oscillations. Thus, a change in income or reserves (or in the error
term for the demand for money if it were added to equation (24)) would lead
to ever increasing upward and downward movements of the interest rates.22
The economics behind this result is fairly straightforward.
Suppose nominal income began to increase and the authorities held total reserves
constant. The increase in the demand for money and hence in the demand
for reserves in the face of an unchanged quantity of reserves supplied
by the central bank, would lead to a rise in interest rates. This increase
would have to be sufficient to offset the desired increase in money, i.e.,
it would be cY/b0, where the numerator represents the increase in the
quantity of money demanded as a result of the income increase and the
denominator represents the effect of a unit increase in interest rates
on money demanded in the current period. If this new interest rate
prevailed in the subsequent period, it would entail a further downward
movement in the demand for money of the order (b1 )becauseof the
0
lagged effect of interest rates on money demanded. But such a downward
movement in money demand and hence in reserves demanded would be
inconsistent with the unchanged supply of reserves. Hence interest rates
have to fall in the second period. The lower interest rates of the second
period would lead to an increase in the quantity of money demanded in
the third period if left unchanged. Hence interest rates would have— 20—
torise in the third period. Whether these oscillations are damped
eventually leading to a stable equilibrium, or undamped, leading to
explosive oscillations, depends on the ratio b1/b0, the relative size
of lagged effects and current effects of interest rates on the demand
for money, as shown above.
One further point should be noted in the context of
this model. If b0 equalled zero, i.e., over the current period the
demand for money did not respond to movements of interest rates, the
interest rate is not determinate. A change in the quantity of money
demanded or quantity of reserves supplied cannot be equilibrated in
the current period by an offsetting interest rate change. For example,
suppose income were to increase and the demand for money increased as
a result. The demand for reserves would rise as transactors tried to
hold more money balances. The banks would try to sell liquid assets
to re—establish their equilibrium and this would drive up interest rates.
But the movement in interest rates cannot affect the quantity of money
demanded until the next period. Hence there is no interest rate at
which the system would be in equilibrium in the current period.
Model 4b: Economic lags, borrowed reserves and excess reserves
In the U.S. institutional structure borrowed reserves
play an important role in the transmission of the policy impulse from
the supply of reserves to interest rates and monetary aggregates. With
the introduction of borrowed reserves one must divide total reserves
into non—borrowed reserves (RNB) which are under the control of the central— 21—
bank,and borrowed reserves (RB) which are created at the initiative
of the banks.23 Total reserves can also be defined as the sum of
required reserves and excess reserves (RE).
(28) RT(t) =RNB(t)+ RB(t)
(29) RT(t) =RR(t)•+ RE(t).
Therestof the model remains as before with contemporaneous reserve
requirements and lagged responses of the demand for money to interest
rate changes; i.e., equations (22), (24), and (25) continue to hold.
To close the model, it is necessary to add a pair of equations describing




(31) RE(t) =p 0<i(t)
As long as the market rate24 exceeds the discount rate (rdis) charged
by the central bank on borrowings by the banks, there is a relationship
between borrowed reserves and the difference between the tworates.25
The greater is this differential, the larger is the amount of borrowing
by the banks. If the market interest rate falls below the discount
rate I assume that all borrowing is repaid. Regardless of the level of
interest rates the banks are assumed to hold a relatively small and fixed— 22—
amountof excess reserves. I also assume that the banks would not be
willing to hold more excess reserves unless the market interest rate fell
very close to zero.26 At such very low interest rates, however, the
demand for excess reserves becomes almost infinitely elastic, as was
the case in the l930s.27
Solving this model for the case in which the market rate
is above the discount rate and the banks are borrowing reserves from
the central bank gives the following pair of equations.
(32) i(t) =
q+db
rdis(t) + q+0 ( +ad+cdY(t)-R(t))— i(t-l)
(33)MA(t) =




(h0+b1) p) - A(t-l).
In comparison with equation (27) in which there was nodiscount window
onecan see that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is
now smaller than before and thereforethe systemis lesslikelyto
be explosive. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable can be
written as b1/(b3 +) ascompared to b1/b0 in the earlier case. The
damping in the oscillation arises from the fact that any increase in
money demanded can now be offset not only by rising interest rates but
also by increased borrowing at the discount window which permits the
monetary aggregate to increase in the short run. Nevertheless the sawtooth
movement in interest rates continues to hold and the monetary aggregate
now also follows the sane sawtooth movement.— 23—
Itis worth emphasizing that holding non—borrowed reserves
constantin this case does not imply that the monetary aggregate will
return to its target value after a shock to the system such as an
increase in income. This can be seen by solving for the equilibritm!
equations corresponding to equations (32) and
(34)=
q+d(0+lD1)
(q rdis + p + ad + cdY —RB)
(35) =
q+d(b0+b1)
((b0+b1) RNB —q(b0+b1)rdis +cqY + qa —(b0+b1)p)
Anincreasein income leads to an increase in interest rates and an
increase in the monetary aggregate even after the system settles down.
The reason is that the higher interest rate (relative to the discount
rate) results in an increase in borrowing from the central bank that
allows the monetary aggregate to expand. In this version of the model,
therefore, an increase in income leads to an increase in the interest
rate which is not sufficient to bring money back to its target.29 If
the authorities wish to keep money on target in the relatively short
run they will have to push up the interest rate from the level that is
consistent with a constant amount of non—borrowed reserves either by
reducing the level of non—borrowed reserves or by raising the discount
rate. Thus an element of discretion is re—introduced to the system in
that the central bank has to decide on the horizon over which the monetary
target should return to its target and the combination of discount rate
increase and decrease in non—borrowed reserves needed to achieve
this result.3°— 24—
Ratherthan pursuing this general model further I wish
to examine more closely the economics of the slightly simpler model
in which b0 equals zero, i.e., interest rates affect money only with
a lag. In the case of the model with no discount window this assumption
led to the result that the interest rate was indeterminate. In the
case of a model with a discount rate the solution to the system is as follows:
(36) i(t) =rdis(t)+ ad+p +YCt) - i(t-l)
db
(37)MA(t) =— RNB(t—l)—
b1rdis(t—l) +(a — +cY(t) — MA(t—l).
Suppose incomewere to increase and hence cause an
increasein money demanded. The increase in the quantity ofmoney
demandedresults in an increase in required reserves and hence an
increased demand for reserves by the banks. The bankswould drive up
theinterest rate either by trying tosell liquid assets or by trying
to increase their borrowing in the federal funds market. Interest
rates would continue to increase until the banks were prepared to increase
their borrowing from the central bank by the amount of the increase in
required reserves. In the next period this increase in interest rates
would lead to a reduction in the demand for money and hence a fall in
required reserves and thus a fall in interest rates. Unlike the earlier
models, the equilibration of the amount of reserves supplied by the
centralbank and that demanded by the banks is brought about in the first
instance not by an adjustment of money demanded (and hence required reserves)
asaresult of interest rate movements but by an increase in borrowing— 25—
atthe discount window. Indeed no adjustment of the current level of
demand deposits demanded is possible in this model given that b0 is equal
to zero, i.e., that there is no response of money demanded to interest
rates in the current period. The increase in the interest rate is initially
therefore determined by the magnitude of q since that represents the
response of borrowed reserves to changes in interestrates.31
It isimportanttorealizethat in these models the
apparentdirect linkage between non—borrowed reserves and the monetary
aggregate no longer exists. For example, as can be seen from equation (37.);
achange in non—borrowed reserves in the current period has no effect
on the aggregate until the following period and the monetary aggregate
will then oscillate until a new short—run equilibrium is reached. And
in this particular case it is very clear that the linkage from non—
borrowed reserves tothemonetary aggregate operates via the rise in interest
ratesand borrowed reserves in the current period to the demand for
raoney in the following period. Whether it is useful to call such a
relationship a money supply curve is a moot point. What is clear is
that the relationship is a good deal more complex than in the earlier
models. It is also clear that it is not possible to hit the monetary
target period—by—period in this modeleven ifone were willing to
accept the implied movements of interest rates because of the lag between
non—borrowed reserves and the monetary aggregate. It follows, therefore,— 26—
thattotal reserves are also not controllable in this model.32 As
discussed above, in the more general model withb0 not equal to zero,
the authorities might be able to achieve their target each period but
only by manipulating non—borrowed reserves and the discount rate
appropriately and accepting possibly explosive oscillations in interest
rates.
In circumstances where the excess reserves provided by
the central bank increase to amounts above the frictional level (p
in equation (31)) desired by the banks it may easily be the case that
the interest rates will settle at just above zero. Thisresult
will occur, for example, when there is a lag in the demandfor money.
Assume a decline in income which leads to a decline inmoney demanded.
With the fall in required reserves, and non—borrowedreserves
constant, banks will try to lend federal funds or buy liquidassets,
thereby driving down interest rates. With lower interest rates and
a constant discount rate the banks will repay their borrowings to
the central bank. If the fall in required reserves is sufficient to
force them into a position where they are holding excess reserves
larger than their desired holdings then the market interest rates will
continue to fall until they are willing to hold the excess reserves.
As indicated above, the banks will probably not be willing to hold
these excess reserves at interest rates much above zero.33 Iam thus
arguing that there is a serious asymmetry in the base control mechanism
that arises from the difference between the demand for borrowedreserves— 27—
andthe demand for excess reserves with the former very sensitive
to market rates of interest and the latter very insensitive to market interest
rates. This asymmetry becomes significant when current rates of interest
have little effect on the current quantity of money demanded.
Formally, the model of positive excess reserves can be
treated by setting q equal to zero in equations (32) and (33) .The
equations collapse (except for terms in p) to equations (26) and (27),
i.e., the discount window ceases to matter. If, in addition, b0 is
very small or indeed zero then interest rates will fall towards zero
very rapidly and the authorities will still not necessarily be able
to achieve the aggregate target over any short horizon.
Model 4c: Institutional lag, borrowed reserves and excess reserves
In this version of the model I introduce lagged reserve
accounting of the sort currently being used in the United States and
Canada. I continue with the U.S. institutional environment of borrowing
at the discount window but drop the economic lags in the demand for
money. Since the results correspond fairly closely to those in the




Requiredreserves are now a function of demand deposits one period
earlier where the period is defined in terms of the length of the
accounting lag. In the case of the United States, for example, this
period is two weeks. The equations describing reserve behaviour, i.e.,
equations (28), (29), (30), and (31) ,arethe same as in the previous
model.
Solving in the usual fashion for the situation in which
equation (30) holds one gets:
(41) i(t) =rdis(t)+(p+ ad ÷cdY(t—1)-RNB(t))- i(t—l)
(42) MA(t) =a-- brdis(t) + RNB(t) + cY(t) -MA(t-1).
These results are formally similar to those in the case of a oneperiod
economic lag inthe demand for money and contemporaneous reserve require-
ments (equations (36) and (37) above) although with slightly different
lag structure. The economic interpretation is somewhat different, however.
Suppose there is an increase in income which leads to an increase in
money demanded. There is no effect on required reserves in the current
period and hence no change in the interest rate in the current period.
In the next period, however, required reserves increase. If the central
bank holds non—borrowed reserves constant, the banks will find themselves
short of reserves. The attempt by the banks to increase their reserves
will lead to an increase in the interest rate as banks attempt to
purchase federal funds, and to sell liquid assets to the public. As29
the short—term interest rate rises relative to the central bank discount
rate banks will turn to the central bank and borrow reserves and the
shortage of reserves will therefore disappear. As a result of the
increase in interest rates there will be a decline in demand deposits
held at the banks. This in turn will lead to a decline in required
reserves in the following period which will lead to a fall in interest
rates and a rise in demand deposits held at the banks. The by—now
familiar sawtooth will be the outcome of this system.34
Turning to the situation in which there are positive
excess reserves in the system, there is no longer any reduced—form
relationship between interest rates or the monetary aggregate and non—
borrowed reserves. If the central bank increases non—borrowed reserves
in such a situation the extra reserves entail an increase in the excess
reserves of the banking system since required reserves are predetermined
and are not affected by movements in current demand deposits. With the
banks unwilling to add excess reserves to their portfolio at interest
rates much above zero, interest rates will clearly fall to very low levels
in such circumstances.35 This scenario becomes of practical significance
in a situation where nominal income falls or grows more slowly than
the targeted rate of growth of money. The fall in income leads to a
fall in current demand deposits which, in turn, leads to a decline in
the following period's required reserves. With non—borrowed reserves
constant, this implies an increase in excess reserves with the consequent
fall in interest rates to very low levels as described.3630 —
3.The New Federal Reserve Procedures
As part of its October 6, 1979 program the Federal
Reserve announced that it was "placing greater emphasis on day—to—day
operations on the supply of bank reserves and less emphasis on confining
short—term fluctuations in the federal funds rate".37 Although the details
of the new operating procedures were not spelled out by the Federal
Reserve in its October 6, 1979 press release, they have since been set
out in a staff paper entitled "The New Federal Reserve Technical Procedures
for Controlling Money".38 In this section of the paper I set out my
interpretation of these procedures in the light of the analysis of the
earlier sections. Although I rely heavily on the staff paper for the
Federal Reserve's own views on how the system is being implemented, the
evaluation I am offering is based in large part on the experience of
the first year of the operation of the reserves control system.
The principal steps in the new methods of controlling
the monetary aggregates can be characterized as follows:
(1) Set growth rates for those aggregates for which the Federal
Reserve establishes targets, i.e., M1A, M1B and M2. In compliance
with the Humphrey—Hawkins Act, target growth rates are set over
a one—year horizon.
(2) Given these targeted growth paths and expectations as to desired
excess reserves, the growth of certificates of deposit and that
of other reservable liabilities not in the targets, the growth
of currency, and the split of deposits between member banks and
non—member banks, the Federal Reserve calculates the implied path
for the family of reserve measures such as total reserves,
monetary base, non—borrowed reserves. The Federal Reserve is
prepared to supply whatever reserves the banks are required to
hold against certificates of deposit and other deposits that are
not components of the narrower monetary aggregates, i.e., M1A,
M18 and M2.— 31—
Twocomments are in order here. First, the Federal Reserve
is engaged in a reserves control process rather than a base control
process for the reason outlined in Section 2.2. A random shift from
demand deposits to currency would lead to much larger movements of the
monetary aggregates under a system of base control than under a system
of reserves control. Second, in Section 2.3, I argued that in an optimal
system reserves would be imposed only against deposits included in the
monetary aggregates and that reserve requirements against these deposits
would be uniform. Given that there are reserves in the U.S. system
against deposits that are not in the monetary aggregates and that reserve
requirements against the deposits within the aggregate are far from
uniform the Federal Reserve must allow for growth in the former types of
deposits and for shifts within the latter types of deposits. It is
easiest to think of the Federal Reserve adjusting non—borrowed reserves
to deal with these "nuisancet' elements.39
(3) The planned path of non—borrowed reserves is calculated from
the path of total reserves by initially assuming a level of
borrowing near that prevailing in a recent period.
(4) Although total reserves are the principal overall objective
of reserve setting, only non—borrowed reserves are directly
under the control of the Federal Reserve chrough open—market operations.
(5) Suppose, for example, M1A began to grow faster than targeted. Given the
path for non—borrowed reserves, the increase in required
reserves would lead the banks to attempt to raise funds in
the federal funds market and hence bid up the federal funds
rate arid to borrow more at the discount window. The higher
interest rates would eventually feed back on M1A and slow down— 32—
itsgrowth rate. In the interim period while the higher
interest rates are having their effect on M1A, required reserves
and hence total reserves will remain above their initial
targeted path. Thus during that period the Federal Reserve can
control only the supply of non—borrowed reserves and not that
of total reserves.
(6) If the Federal Reserve wished to speed up the effect of its policy
and bring total reserves down more quickly, it could lower the
non—borrowed reserve path and/or raise the discount rate. Both
these actions would have the effect of raising interest rates
more than otherwise and hence would reduce the growth of M1A
(and thus of required reserves and total reserves) more quickly
than using the strategy of holding non—borrowed reserves to
their initial path and leaving the discount rate unchanged.
The analysis of model 4b throws some light on this aspect
of the analysis. As shown there, holding non—borrowed reserves to their
target path is likely not to have a sufficiently large effect on interest
rates to bring the monetary aggregate back to its target in a relatively
short period of time. Hence the Federal Reserve can speed the impact
of its actions on the monetary aggregate (and therefore on total reserves)
by increasing the discount rate or reducing the level of non—borrowed
reserves. The Federal Reserve must thus make a choice between a fairly
automatic policy in which it adheres to a target path for non—borrowed
reserves while allowing the monetary aggregates and total reserves to
deviate from their target paths for lengthy periods of time (a long
horizon policy) or a policy with substantial discretion over non—
borrowed reserves and discount rates which aims at bringing the monetary
aggregatesand total reserves back to their target path in a short
period of time (a short horizon policy) .Oneelement entering the
decision between long horizon and short horizon policy is the substantially— 33—
greatercredibility the Federal Reserve would achieve by controlling
the aggregates and total reserves over a shorter time period. Offsetting
this, however, is the increase in interest rate volatility from choosing
a shorter horizon. Indeed, as indicated in the various models in
Section 2.4, if the Federal Reserve tries to hit its aggregate targets
over too short an horizon period, it might create an explosive oscillation
of interest rates. Furthermore, with the lag structures at work in the
economy it is possible that both interest rates and the monetary aggregates
will display ever—increasing cycles.40
The principal conclusion of this part of the analysis is
that the choice of horizon is crucial. A relatively short horizon for
bringing monetary aggregates and total reserves back to their target path
would imply very sharp movements in interest rates and non—borrowed
reserves and possibly even explosive oscillations in these variables. With
a longer horizon, interest rates and non—borrowed reserves would be less
volatile but total reserves and monetary aggregates would remain above
target for a longer period of time following the increase in income.
Another aspect of the control system that has become
apparent over the year is the asymmetry on the upside and on the downside.
As noted above (in Section 2.4) with non—borrowed reserves remaining on
theirtarget path, an increase in income would lead to a rise in interest
rates and, in the short run, the size of this increase would be dependent
on the response of borrowed reserves to the differential between the
interest rate and the discount rate. Conversely if income fell34 -
substantiallyand non—borrowed reserves remained on their growth path,
then interest rates would fall, borrowed reserves would be repaid and
the system would likely move into a position in which it was holding
excess reserves. With banks generally unwilling to hold more than
frictional amounts of excess reserves even when interest rates are
relatively low, the interest rates have to fall to very low levels to
induce the banks to hold the excess reserves. Furthermore the fall in
interest rates would probably be very rapid. The asymmetry between the
two casesarises because the demand for borrowed reserves depends on the
differential between the interest rateand the discount rate whereas
the demand for excess reserves above a minimum frictional level is zero
for all interest rates above a very low level. This asymmetry implies
that the Federal Reserve would have to live with total reserves (and
non—borrowed reserves) below target paths for a longer period of time
than it would like unless it is prepared to see interest rates fall
to very low levels. Since such an outcome is unlikely to be palatable,
the Federal Reserve will not be able to follow an automatic non—borrowed
reserves path when the monetary aggregate falls substantially below its
target.
4. The Canadian Institutional Structure
Detailed descriptions of the way in which cash setting
by the Bank of Canada affects the excess reserves of the chartered banks
and thus influences short—term interest rates in Canada can be found in-. 35—
Dingle,Sparks and Walker (1972) and White and Poloz (1980). The model
underlying these descriptions can be characterized as a disequilibrium
model and hence does not fall into the same category as the equilibrium
models discussed in this paper. Nonetheless it is possible to capture
important elements of the Canadian structure by adding one equation to
the set of equations used in earlier models.
The flavour of the type of analysis of the Canadian system
coming out of the Bank of Canada is suggested by the following quotation
from Clinton and Lynch (1979):
"Suppose for example the Bank were to embark upon a more expansionary
policy. Initially, the chartered banks would be confronted with
an excess supply of cash reserves. In their efforts to eliminate
theexcess they would buy assets, causing interest rates to decline
and the money supply to increase, just as in the familiartextbook
creditmultiplier. However, because of the lagged reserve requirement,
expansion of the banking system- does not bring about a reduction
in excess reserves. Thus, there is no definite limit on the
expansion of the system that will follow from a given increase in
excess reserves. As long as an excess supply remains in the system
a disequilibrium persists and the banks continue to expand.
Analytically the problem is that if the demand for excess reserves
is not a function of the level of this month's deposits or interest
rates then the demand for total reserves is a predetermined function
of lagged deposits, and the supply of reserves is given by monetary
policy. Equilibrium thus requires the mutual coincidence of two
predeterminedvariables and the system is overdetermined. In
practice the process is typically brought to a halt not by a self—
equilibrating market mechanism but by the central bank itself
withdrawing the excess, having achieved its desired effect on
short—term interest rates or some other proximate target. The
point to note is that at the end of the month the level of bank
reserves will not necessarily indicate an expansionary policy."
It is of interest to try to describe this type of behaviour













(48) RE(t) =p 0 <i(t)
Required reserves are a function of lagged demand deposits under the
system of lagged reserve requirements in use in Canada. I ignore for
the sake of simplicity the fact that there are reserves against time
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deposits. Total reserves are equal to non—borrowed reserves and also
to the sum of excess reserves and required reserves. Although there
is occasional borrowing by the chartered banks from the Bank of Canada,
this usually occurs at the end of an averaging period and is often the
result of an unexpected clearing swing against a bank on the last day
of the averaging period. Without going into detail on this point, I
believe that it is fair to characterize the Canadian system as an
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excess reserves system despite occasional borrowings. Demand deposits
are assumed to respond to interest rate movements with a distributed
lag. The monetary aggregate is defined in termsofdemand deposits. Of
course, in Canada, the narrow aggregate which the authorities use as
an intermediate target is Ml, the sum of currency and demand deposits,— 37—
butonce again for the sake of simplicity, I ignore currency in the
discussion that follows. Finally, the excess reserves desired on
average by the banking system are equal to a constant, p.43 In practice,
in Canada, the average amount of excess reserves is normally on the
order of less than 0.05 of 1 per cent of statutory deposits or about
$60 million.
As can easily be seen by attempting to solve the
model, there is no determinate equilibrium for interest rates or the
monetary aggregate if one were to treat RNB as the driving variable of
the model. To characterize what actually happens in the Canadian system,
albeit crudely, one has to add a disequilibrium equation which links
the change in interest rates to the difference between the actual amount
of excess reserves in the system and the desired holdings of the
chartered banks. Thus equation (48') is replaced by the following equation.
(49) i Ct) —i(t—l)=-s(RE(t)—p)
If excess reserves exceed (fall short of) those desired by the banks
(i.e. p) interest rates fall (rise). The coefficient s reflects the
magnitude of the change in interest rates in each period to the excess
or shortfall in excess reserves. Note that if excess reserves are held
above the desired level indefinitely interest rates would eventually
fall to levels close to zero as in the earlier equilibrium models. It
is the fact that it takes time for such a fall to occur that is the crux
of the Canadian system since the surplus of excess reserves will be38 —
removedby the Bank of Canada when interest rates reach the desired
levels, i.e., well before they reach zero.
One can now sketch out the mechanism used by the
Canadian authorities to achieve monetary aggregate targets.44 Suppose
the aggregate is initially on target45 but that nominal income subsequently
begins to grow at a faster rate than that consistent with the targets.
The level of money demanded will rise above the target as a result of
the income increase. The authorities then decide to raise interest rates
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to the level required to bring money back to target. Because of the lags
in the money demand equation and the danger of instrument instability
or excessive volatility of interest rates, the increase in interest
rate is designed to bring money back to target not immediately but in
a reasonable period of time where the latter is determined from the
properties of the money demand equation. To achieve this increase
in interest rates, the authorities temporarily reduce the amount of
reservesto the system, reducing the amount ofexcess reserves below
the desired level, and thus forcing the banks tosellliquidassets
andbid aggressively for large blocks of time deposits. Both these
actions result in an increase in short—term interest rates. When
the desired level of interest rates is reached, the reserves previously
removed are returned to the system, the banks no longer are short of
funds, and interest rates remain at their new level. This in turn
eventually brings money back to its target value.— 39—
Themovement of total reserves over the period under
discussion is largely the result of the movements of other variables
and is therefore of little interest to the policymakers. There are
four elements affecting the level of reserves in the example. First,
as a result of the increase in money demand required reserves rise in the
following period and hence total reserves increase. Second, the reduction
in excess reserves is mirrored by a decline in total reserves but the
amounts involved are very small (i.e., s is large). Third, until the
higher interest rates influence the quantity of money demanded total
reserves will remain high. Fourth, when money demand falls back to
the target required reserves will fall and so will total reserves.
To make these points in a slightly more concrete fashion
we can use the system of equations (43) to (47) and (49).Suppose nominal
income rises it period t by one unit. Themonetary aggregate rises
in period t by c units. Suppose the policymakersdecide in period (t+l)
that the cause of the increase inmoney demand was a rise in income
47 and it was not simply random noise. If b2 were larger than the sum
of b0 and b1 it would not be possible to re—achievethe target money
balances in less than three periods withoutintroducing explosive
oscillations in interest rate. Hence the authorities wouldact to increase
the interest rate in period (t+l) byc/(b0 + b1 + b2) and hold it there,
thereby aiming at bringing money back to target in period (t+4).To
achieve the higher interest rate in period (t+l)non—borrowed reserves
and hence excess reserves would be reducedby (
C
s b0+b1+b2during period— 40—
(t+l).Once the interest rate rose to its new level these reserveswould
beput back into the system.
Using these elements one can calculate the movement in
total reserves brought about by the change in income as follows. tn
period t,thereis no change in total reserves since the increase in
demand deposits affects required reserves only with a lag. The change
in total reserves in period (t+l) is composed of an increase of dc units
in required reserves (one unitincreasein income results in c units
increase in demand deposits which in turn causes anincrease of dcunits
inrequired reserves). Offsetting this in part is the decline in excess
reserves set into motion by the authorities of units which is Ol2
needed to raise interest rates. Thus the net increase in total reserves
in period (t+l) is cd —1 .Inperiod (t+2) these excess
reserves are put back into the system but required reserves fall because
of the effect of the increase in interest rates on money demanded in
period(t+l). Hence, compared tothe initial position in period t,
b
totalreserves are higher by cd —cdb+b
.Inperiod (t+3) 012
requiredreserves are pushed down further by the effect of the continuing
highinterest rates on demand deposits in period (t+2) .Thuscompared
b0 b1 to the initial position total reserves are higher by cd —cd
b +b012
Finally, in period (t+4) total reserves are back to their initial
equilibrium since money returned to its initial value in period (t+3).
As can be seen by this outline the movement of total reserves isvery— 41—
mucha resultant of other behavioural actions and hence is not a useful
guide to central bank actions.
Clearly the above characterization is very crude. The
relationship between excess reserves and interest rates is much more
complex than indicated, as can be seen in the two articles cited at the
beginning of this section. Nonetheless two principal conclusions can
be drawn from the analysis. First, there is a recursive element in the
Canadian policy structure which runs from (1) movements of the monetary
aggregate, to (2) the desired setting of interest rates intended to
re—establish the target levels of the monetary aggregate at some future
date, to(.3) the temporary setting of excess cash in order to achieve
the desired level of interest rate. Second, the movement of total
reserves is a combination of the movements in required reserves resulting
from the movement in deposits the previous period and of the temporary
movements of excess reserves needed to achieve changes in interest rates.
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in sheer size the former overwhelm the latterand hence total reserves
are not a variable which can be used to interpret central bank actions.
5. Conclusions
In this paper I have examined some of the implications
of the rigid version of base control. It seems clear in the case of
those models that incorporate either institutional or economic lags
that base control may entail very sharp and possibly explosive
oscillations of very short—term interest rates. These in turn are— 42—
likelyto lead to sharp oscillations in longer—term money market and
bond market rates. There may be forms of base control whichare
sufficiently flexible to avoid the problems discussed in this paper.
I believe that it is incumbent on the proponents of base control to
specify with some precision the kind of less rigid rules for base control
that would give sensible results. Furthermore they must consider whether
changes in institutional structure would be needed to make their system
workable and whether the new rules would be likely to lead to the
requisite changes in behaviour by market participants. Finally, they
must show that this type of system would perform better than thesystem
currently in place. It is only in the context of a well—defined proposal
for base control embedded in a moderately realistic model of the
financial system (i.e., one with lags and stochastic error variables)
that the debate can proceed.NOTES
1.A recent theoretical analysis of these questions of strategy can
be found in Freedman (1980).
2. In one sense this formulation of the problem is inaccurate since
the authorities operate on reserves (or excess reserves in Canada)
to influence interest rates even when the latter are used to affect
the monetary aggregate. Nonetheless, in a more basic sense the
distinction remains since in a base control system the authorities
aim at money directly via the movement of base without using interest
rates as a proximate instrument. This does not mean, however, that
interest rates play no role in bringing about the movement of money
in response to a change in base, as will be seen below.
3.A detailed discussion of the new procedures can be found in Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1980) and Axilrod and
Lindsey (1980). The former has been excerpted and discussed in
Lang (1980).
4. United Kingdom (1980).
5. Coimnents by Karl Brunner at Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference,
October 1980. But see B1ttler et al (1979) in which base is treated
as the instrument for achieving the desired money target.
6. See, for example, Clinton and Lynch (1979) and the references cited
therein. More recent studies include Johannes and Rasche (1979) and
B'tittler et al (1979).
7. The question of the usefulness of the concept of the supply ofmoney
will be addressed below.
8. The magnitude of these random movements in the very short run is a
significant element in the controversy whether to use base or interest
rate control to achieve monetary aggregate targets. If the demand
for money were volatile in the very short run but stable over an
intermediate run, the Poole analysis would imply use of interest rates
in the very short run to control the monetary aggregate in the
intermediate run.
9.In the Canadian case this assumption is particularly suspect since
there is a very quick linkage from interest rates to exchange rates
and then to prices.
10. The price level is thus implicitly assumed to be constant throughout
the analysis.
11. This statement is true only for the class of models in whichmoney
demand is assumed always to be in (short—run) equilibrium. The class
of disequilibrium models permit a distinction between the supply of
money and demand for money. However, as suggested below, the concept
of the supply of money is not necessarily a useful one.12. This point becomes more substantive when one reaches thecase of
lagged reserve accounting where the notion of a money supply based
on the reserves of the banking system becomes much more difficult to
conceptualize whereas the notions of the demand for and supply of
reserves continue to hold without modification. This point will be
developed in section 2.4(b) below when lagged reserve accounting is
introduced.
13. I ignore the fact that in some jurisdictions the government is the
issuer of at least part of the currency (e.g., coin).
14. If the central bank finds it difficult in the short run to track
shifts between currency and deposits, a case can be made for focussing
on a reserve path rather than a base path. A shift of $1 from demand
deposits to currency in the former case leads to a $1 increase in
money whereas in the latter it leads to a $9 decline in money. See
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1980) for such a
justification of a reserve target rather than a base target.
15. This formulation presupposes zero or at least fixed interest rates
on demand deposits and the assumption of gross substitutability.
16. In this formulation income is proxying for both income and wealth,
which would be introduced separately in a correctly specified equation.
One could also model the ratio of time deposits to demand deposits
but the results of this formulation of the problem are less revealing
for our purposes.
17. This simple conclusion might have to be modified for a model in which
the banks conduct liability side management rather than liquid asset
management. Note also that in certain cases reserve requirements are
imposed for equity or efficiency reasons that are unrelated to the
question of monetary control.
18. The problems created by imposing reserves on deposits thatare not
part of the target monetary aggregate or by non—uniform reserve
requirements are much easier to handle in a system with lagged reserve
requirements than in a system with contemporaneous reserve requirements.
19. This result is simply a reflection of the lower elasticity of the
broader aggregate with respect to market interest rates when the rate
on time deposits moves in line with market rates.
20. The careful reader will note that if the lag structure of the demand
for money with respect to income were identical to that withrespect
to interest rates the oscillation of interest rates in response to an
increase in income would disappear in some of the models of this
section. If the mean lag on income were shorter than that on interest
rates, a result found in some demand for money equations, the oscillation
results would continue to hold however. Perhaps more important, an
increase in the price level in those models of money demand in which
prices affect money with no lag, or a movement in the error term in
the demand for money equation will give rise to the types of oscillations
described. Hence the result is more general than indicated in the text.21. In making this assertion I have implicitly defined the time period
in which the analysis is cast as the period over which proponents
of base control wish to achieve control over the money supply. This
period is sufficiently short that the statement in the text holds.
22. This argument and the corresponding ones in the rest of this section
of the paper are closely related to the notion of instrument instability
in Holbrook (1972). The fact that the authorities are using reserves
rather than interest rates to control money does not cause the problem
of potentially explosive oscillations of the interest rate to disappear.
It simply reappears in a slightly different guise. Discussion of
the possibility that interest rate movements could be explosive can
also be found in Pierce and Thomson (1972), Ciccolo (1974) and
Lombra and Struble (1979).
23. The central bank has some influence over the amount of borrowing through
its control over the discount rate and through its administration of
the discount window.
24. In a more complex model one would use the federal funds rate in the
borrowed reserves equation and, say, a 90—day rate in the demand for
money equation. This would require the addition of another equation
linking the 90—day rate to the federal funds rate.
25. The coefficient q is at least partly related to the way in which the
discount window is administered. Thus the "reluctance" of banks
to borrow from the central bank can be influenced by the behaviour of
the central bank. One could also add a constant to equation (30)
to represent a certain small amount of borrowing that takes place even
when the interest rate falls below the discount rate but this would
not change the analysis.
26. A slightly less stringent set of assumptions that would lead to
virtually the same results would involve replacing the right hand side
of equation (31) by p —ni(t)where n is a small number.
27. Although the behavioural equation from the point of view of the
banks treats borrowed reserves as a function of the level of the interest
rate (relative to the discount rate), from the point of view of the
system as a whole it is preferable to think of borrowed reserves
as the given factor and the interest rates as endogenously determined.
With the central bank setting non—borrowed reserves, required reserves
a function of income and mainly lagged interest rates, and a constant
level of excess reserves, borrowed reservesare almost a residual of
the system. Thus in the analysis that follows I will consider separately
the case in which banks have positive borrowed reserves and that in which
themovements of non—borrowed reserves and required reserves result
in the banks having no borrowed reserves on their balance sheet, i.e.,
an excess reserves case.28. Recall that I am assuming that there is no effect on income of changes
in interest rates in the period under study. Hence the notion of
equilibrium must be interpreted as a temporary position before the
influence of financial variables on the real economy begins to take
effect.
29. Eventually, of course, the higher interest rates will lead to a
slowdown in income growth which will bring the monetary aggregate back
to its target.
30. In the simple model which we are using, if the authorities were to
float the discount rate on market rates, then (32) and (33) basically
collapse to equations (26) and (27) and the monetary aggregate is
always on target. That is, the discount window becomes irrelevant
if the margin between the market rate and discount rate never moves.
Recall, however, that the oscillation of interest rates may well be
explosive in equation (27).
31.In this model, floating the interest rate on the discount rate leads
to an indeterminacy of the interest rate, as can be seen from equation
(36). The reason is that with a floating discount rate there is no
way to equilibrate a shortage of reserves caused by an increase in
money demanded since neither the public nor the banks respond to a
movement in current rates.
32. If one thinks of excess reserves as constant at some frictional level,
total reserves will follow required reserves which, in turn, are a
function of the monetary aggregate. If the monetary aggregate is not
controllable, neither are total reserves.
33. Floating the discount rate will make no difference to the outcome
since interest rates must fall sufficiently to induce the banks to
hold the excess reserves and the discount rate is not an argument
in the demand function for excess reserves.
34. In principle the central bank could prevent the sawtooth in money
and interest rates from arising by offsetting the increas.e in income
by the appropriate decline in non—borrowed reserves. This, however,
requires perfect information regarding the movement of income.
35. Even if excess reserves moved slightly in response to changes in
interest rates the result would be only slightly modified.
36. One can easily combine the one—period lag in the demand for money
and lagged reserve accounting. The resulting interest rate pattern
is one in which interest rates oscillate every second period. More
complicated models with n period lags can be constructed by the
interested reader. The resulting nth order difference equations may
be difficult to solve but are very likely to give cyclical movements
which maywellbe undamped.
37. Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1979, page 830.
38. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1980). This paper
has been discussed in Lang (1980).39. Note that it is much easier to deal with these problems in a system
with lagged reserve accounting than in one with contemporaneous
reserve accounting.
40. Adding an expenditure sector and a price sector to the model may, under
certain circumstances, strengthen the conclusion in the text regarding
an unstable cyclical response. Suppose, for example, that the
authorities are following a short horizon policy which has caused
interest rates to increase sharply in response to an increase in the
monetary aggregate which resulted from an increase in the rate of growth
of nominal income. It may be the case that at the same time as the lagged
effects of the high interest rates drive the monetary aggregate below
its target they also slow down the growth of real income and perhaps
prices and, hence, intensify the downward movements of the monetary
aggregate. Thus the possibility of explosive oscillations in the
monetary aggregate and interest rates may be increased by introducing
the interrelationship of the financial sector and the real and price
sectors into the model.
41. In any event the Bank of Canada is willing to supply whatever reserves
are required to support these time deposits since they are not part
of the target monetary aggregate.
42. The purchase and resale arrangements (PRA) between the money market
dealers and the Bank of Canada also do not vitiate this judgement.
43. It would make little difference to the analysis if desired excess
reserves were weakly related to the level of interest rates.
44. See White (1976) for an early account of this mechanism.
45. For purposes of simplicity I ignore the existence of the band in
the analysis that follows.
46. There may be a lag at this point because of the need to decide whether
the increase in money was random in which case there should be no
interest rate change or was a result of an increase in income.
47. This distinction assumes a random error v also is part of the demand
for money equation.
48. This is particularly the case since required reserves also move in
response to movements in time deposits and Government of Canada deposits.REFERENCES
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